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Pte Pettersson

Fire Support Group
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About Pte Pettersson

  • Birthday 08/31/1990

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  1. +++++091834ZFEB14+++++FLASH/CRITIC+++++091834ZFEB14+++++FLASH/CRITIC+++++091834ZFEB14+++++FLASH/CRITIC+++++091834ZFEB14+++++FLASH/CRITIC TO: MAJ HICKS OC A COY 16AA BDE FROM: LT COL FROST OC 2PARA 16AA BDE SUBJECT: OPERATION FLINTLOCK - FRAGO # 1 PRIORITY: FLASH/CRITIC CLASSIFICATION: SECRET UK EYES ONLY ++++++++++++++BEGINS++++++++++++++++ 1. SITUATION All in addition to current OPORD The situation in the region of town GABU is deteriorating. Additional enemy forces has moved down from the northern border of the AO to disrupt british effort to stabilize the region. Commanders A-Coy has reached an understanding with elders in the town of Nhelenghue to assure a joint effort to protect the civilian population of the town. (A ) Enemy Forces (1) Disposition, Composition and Strength (a ) Disposition The forces of GABU has lately shown discontent with the British forces and are determined improbable to willingly comply with British instructions. Intelligence does suggest that they are losing support from their local population. Newly arrived Rebel forces has moved down from the northern borders of the AO and started delaying actions against british forces and employed harassment tactics to sap our strength and further destabilize the region. ICOM chatter has shown that these forces are better organized and employ proper radio communications and use this to properly coordinate their movements. (b ) Composition Militia forces in GABU are unchanged since before, but have been reinforced by at least a platoon sized force of northern rebel forces. Newly arrived enemy forces is confirmed to possess Armored capabilities. And unconfirmed but probable intelligence have pointed to the capacity for limited mechanized units operating i support of the armor. Additionally, the enemy has been known to operate anti air assets and seems capable to quickly form and employ MANPAD AA hunting teams to deny access to the airspace. Unconfirmed Intelligence shows to the availability of armed gunship support, but reconnaissance currently show no signs of the logistical support being present and therefore it is improbable that said gunships would be present at this time. (c )Strength The newly arrived rebel forces are determined to number beyond the strength of a company. Unknown number of support weapons and armored vehicles in the region at this time. The brigade is sending additional assets to investigate and reconnoiter the enemy forces. At this time the enemy is known to possess forces in the size of COMPANY, but considered probable to possess forces beyond the size of a BATALLION (2) Capabilities (a ) Maneuver The probable scheme of maneuver of the enemy is infantry tactics and employing hit and run tactics supported by the dense foliage. The enemy is also capable of using mines and explosive devices to disrupt British movement. Enemy forces also possess a limited capacity to employ motorized warfare from soft skinned vehicles.[/indent] (b ) Intelligence As before (c ) Fire Support The enemy possess capable indirect fire support in the form of small amounts of short range artillery systems. It is also known that the enemy possess competent observers. Enemy forces do possess limited night fighting capabilities in the form of illumination ammunition. (e ) Air Defence The enemy possess limited Air Defence assets. Mostly in the form of shoulder launched AAA missiles. Also in possession of antique AAA gun platforms in the form of old Russian static weapon systems. (f ) Combat service support No change. (g ) Command and Control The enemy possess adequate capacity for command and control.The enemy is also gauged probable to operate in independent smaller units. Enemy radios have been intercepted through ICOM, the enemy is not yet gauged to be aware of this. (3) Most Probable Course of Action No change, the armored capabilities will be utilized in support of current established tactics. (4) Most Dangerous Course of Action No change, our supperior air power will force them to not utilize their armored forces in the open, which would be needed to use them in assault of our forces. (B ) Friendly Forces No change (C ) Enviroment (1) Obstacle The enemy is located inside built up civilian regions. Our ROEs still do not permit excessive force on civilian property, stretching to the use of indirect fire and close air support. Meaning our forces will be limited to hand held weapons inside the confines of the built up regions. (2) Avenues of Approach The enemy uses the roads leading north from GABU, but is not gauged to be limited to them as they are known to operate within the jungle. Should also take note that they could be capable of circumventing friendly forces through the jungles to the east of our position. (3) Key Terrain The town of GABU is vital to deny the enemy access to the civilian population and deny them the establish routes of transport and their contact network within the town. Also, the town of MADIMBA is a key terrain, but would currently stretch our forces too much if we secure it. (4) Cover and concealment The enemy has access to armored vehicles which has thus far been hard for own forces to localize which points to a good capability to camouflage positions. 2. MISSION Who? 2 Para 16 Air Assault Brigade What? Move into the region GABU to demilitarize and deny northern rebel forces from establishing a presence in the town to use it as a human shield. When? 270430ZNOV14, 0630 Local Time Where? Region North-East of Kedougou. Why? Stabilize the region of GABU and prevent enemy forces from moving into and through the town. 3. Execution Intent (A ) Commanders Intent My intent is to establish a connection with the civilian population of GABU to pave way for future cooperation and deny the enemy rebels from abusing them and forcing them into combat with British forces. (B ) Concept of Ops We will accomplish this by placing forces inside the GABU and pushing the rebel forces and their associates out of the town. The decisive point is to get British forces into the town and gaining a foothold with as little force as possible. It is decisive because if we do not succeed with both we can not guarantee the civilian populations safety and will be unable to neither send relief help nor gain their trust and support. A Company is responsible for the planning and execution of this movement. B Company will work towards a supporting effort and will be continue to be responsible for maintaining security on the roadnet leading up to the town of KEDOUGOU to maintain a logistic chain and allow WHO/WFO units to operate in the area of the main effort. C Company will be responsible for patrols north of B company locations to deny the enemy the possibility to move west towards the town of Kedougu. The purpose of Fires is to allow our forces to maintain fire superiority and beat the enemy without having to pursue them into the terrain. Great care needs to be taken to ensure no civilian casualties and limited destruction of civilian property. The purpose of engineers is to provide forces of A and B company with patrol bases and fixed positions from which to deny the enemy movement. The intent is to increase the survivability and longevity of our own forces. Additionally they are to provide the civilian population with assistance with repairing destroyed property and provide safe locations to avoid enemy fire. The end state of this operation is a DMZ around the town of GABU. (C ) Maneuver Mission Tasks A Company Prepare and execute patrol into Gabu to push rebel forces out of the city. At discretion of A Company Commander, establish a permanent location within the city to protect the civilian population and prevent rebel forces from re entering the town. At discretion of A Company Commander, perform demilitarization under amnesty for 24 hours. Prepare a plan for receiving WFP/WHO convoys into the region to distribute to the local population. B Company Continue operations in region east of A Coy and west of Kedougou. Assist C and A Company with QRF forces Prepare a plan for patrols north into region of MANSOA. C Company Maintain a QRF of Platoon Size. Take over B company patrols north into region of MANSOA. (D ) Supporting Units Mission Tasks Combat Engineer Continue in assistance of A company according to discretion A company commander. Fire Support Team Will remain deployed together with A Company. Refer to tasks of A Company. Battalion Mortar Team Remain at PB Lancaster to provide fire support for the Battalion, main effort is still A Coy. (E ) Coordinating Instructions Fire Plan No Indirect fire to be used if Civilian property is in danger. No Close Air Support to be called in outside of discretion Brigade Air Cell according to the current RoE. Priority of Fire support is effort by A Company Actions On Contact - Engage the enemy forces as per SOP. Extreme care to be taken not to engage civilians nor unwarrented destruction of civilian property. Civilian casualties - Will be a priority to CASEVAC for evacuation/treatment. Concerned Coy Command will issue a written report to Battalion HQ as soon as possible. Civilians - Approach and question. People who show malcontent may be apprehended at discretion local commander. Personnel of interest?s name, occupation and features is still to be noted down (or photographed) and provided in intelligence reports to be able to establish a database for future reference. Detainees - Those who actively disrupt the actions of our forces is to be detained and questioned by respective company commander. If they provide intelligence of importance an airlift is to be prepared to take them to Battalion HQ for further investigation. Weapons found - Main effort is currently to demilitarize the region as the need to easier distinguish civilian from active forces is considered crucial. At discretion local commander, weapons found may be seized. If so, they are to to be cataloged and turned over to the Battalion for processing. Rules of Engagement Card Alpha Limit of Exploitation Northern Boundary LINE ALONG N2800 Southern Boundary LINE ALONG N2100 Company Boundary LINE ALONG E1000 Eastern Boundary LINE FROM E1400 N2100 TO E1800 N2600 Western Boundary LINE FROM E0600 N2300 TO E0900 N2900 Miscellaneous All Personnel is to wear personal IR strobes if available while operating in low light settings for PID by friendly forces and air assets. Timings 270430ZNOV14 - A Company is to start movement to region GABU. 281600ZNOV14 - No later than, WFP/WHO is to enter the region to relief civilian population. MAP DATA TBC ++++++++++++++ENDS++++++++++++++++ +++++DTMY+++++FLASH/CRITIC+++++DTMY+++++FLASH/CRITIC+++++DTMY+++++FLASH/CRITIC+++++DTMY+++++FLASH/CRITIC
  2. [Spoiler][IMG]http://i.imgur.com/35zdJeF.png[/IMG][/Spoiler] [Spoiler][IMG]http://i.imgur.com/JGLmSiL.png[/IMG][/Spoiler]
  3. 2. Mission Who? 2 Para 16 Air Assault Brigade What? Establish presence on the ground and establish an intelligence picture of the local area. When? 231300ZNOV14, 1500 Local Time Where? Region North-East of Kedougou. Why? Create the foundation to ensure a safe environment for WHO and WFO Humanitarian efforts. 3. Execution Intent (A) Commanders Intent My intent is to establish a connection with the civilian population to create an intelligence picture that allows us to predict the enemy?s disposition and plan of action. I also want to deny the enemy the support of the population. (B) Concept of Ops We will accomplish this by establishing a presence and patrolling the region. We will also start to distribute supplies and food to the population to create a trust of the British forces. The decisive point is to deny the enemy access to the local population and create a safe zone around the populated areas by establishing fixed positions blocking the likely routes of advance. It is decisive because it makes it possible for us to discern enemy from civilian and it also allows us to keep the civilians from being molested and threatened which would ultimately lead to us losing their trust. A Company will work towards the main effort and will be responsible for the central region of MGANZA NYOGO/KYETE and GABU. B Company will work towards a supporting effort and will be responsible for maintaining security on the roadnet leading up to the town of KEDOUGOU to maintain a logistic chain and allow WHO/WFO units to operate in the area of the main effort. C Company will work towards a supporting effort and will be in reserves to relieve A and B company to keep battle stress low. They are also responsible for maintaining the Battalion QRF. The purpose of Fires is to allow our forces to maintain fire superiority and beat the enemy without having to pursue them into the terrain. The purpose of engineers is to provide forces of A and B company with patrol bases and fixed positions from which to deny the enemy movement. The intent is to increase the survivability and longevity of our own forces. The end state of this operation is a safety zone that allows WHO/WFO to distribute food and supplies to the local population. © Maneuver Mission Tasks A Company Airlift into the region of MGANZA NYOGO/KYETE and create an intelligence picture to allow future operation. At discretion of A Company Commander, establish a contact with local population in the region in and near MGANZA NYOGO/KYETE. Designate positions to build fortifications to allow troops to be stationed in the area. Priority is a position for use as a fire support position by the Battalion Mortar Team when deployed with A Company. Prepare a plan for patrols into the terrain between MGANZA NYOGO/KYETE and GABU. B Company Airlift into the terrain west of MGANZA NYOGO/KYETE and patrol the terrain, emphasis on finding key positions in the terrain to establish patrol bases to dominate the ground. Start patrols along roads leading from KEDOUGOU and towards the AO of main effort At discretion B Company Commander, establish contact with local population in jungle near main routes. Prepare a plan for patrols north into region of MANSOA. C Company Maintain a QRF of Platoon Size. Remainder of Company on 50% watch throughout first 24h. C Company Command will stay close by Battalion command to maintain an intelligence picture of the AO of A and B Company. (D) Supporting Units Mission Tasks Combat Engineer Prepare pallets for Airlift to allow transport of supplies required for establishing patrol bases. Maintain a 50% watch throughout first 12 hours. Standby to deploy to AO at first light, approximate 0700z, to assist in establishing PBs at points designated by A and B company. Fire Support Team Will deploy together with A Company. Refer to tasks of A Company. Will designate landing zones in vicinity of designated PBs if possible. Battalion Mortar Team Keep 1 team ready as a QRF to deploy with elements C Company. Rest of Mortars to remain on 50% watch for first 12h. Ready to deploy with elements of Combat Engineers at 0700z to designated fire support PB. (E) Coordinating Instructions Fire Plan No Indirect fire to be used if Civilian property is in danger. No Close Air Support to be called in outside of discretion Brigade Air Cell according to the current RoE. Indirect fire will be unavailable for the first 24h until elements of the Battalion Mortar Team is deployed. Priority of Fire support is effort by A Company Actions On Contact - Seek to disengage from the enemy and try to gather as much intelligence as possible. Only allowed to engage the enemy if they pose a danger to civilians or a direct threat to own forces without reasonable chance of disengaging without sustaining casualties. Civilian casualties - Will be a priority to CASEVAC for evacuation/treatment. Concerned Coy Command will issue a written report to Battalion HQ as soon as possible. Civilians - Approach and question. People who show malcontent should be noted down but may not be apprehended. Personnel of interest?s name, occupation and features is to be noted down (or photographed) and provided in intelligence reports to be able to establish a database for future reference. Detainees - Those who actively disrupt the actions of our forces is to be detained and questioned by respective commander. If they provide intelligence of importance an airlift is to be prepared to take them to Battalion HQ for further investigation. Weapons found - Main effort is currently not to demilitarize the region as it will infuriate the local population. Weapons found outside of the populated region, with no apparent claimant around is to be cataloged and turned over to the Battalion for processing. Rules of Engagement Card Alpha Limit of Exploitation Northern Boundary LINE ALONG N2800 Southern Boundary LINE ALONG N2100 Company Boundary LINE ALONG E1000 Eastern Boundary LINE FROM E1400 N2100 TO E1800 N2600 Western Boundary LINE FROM E0600 N2300 TO E0900 N2900 Miscellaneous All Personnel is to wear personal IR strobes if available while operating in low light settings for PID by friendly forces and air assets. Timings 231345ZNOV14 - All Personnel to standby to start loading airframes if necessary 231400ZNOV14 - All Personnel to standby to embark on Airframes 231415ZNOV14 - Start of Operations, Airframes Liftoff 231430ZNOV14 - A Coy lands at HLS 240700ZNOV14 - All Elements secure for Airlift of Engineers 241345ZNOV14 - All Coy Commanders to standby for new briefing. 4. Service Support Dress - British Combat Order with UN headgear, Beret or Helmet with blue cover. Ammo - Company should carry reserves for 24h autonomy. Medical - Company command will call for CASEVAC and designate HLS as per SOP Transport - Rotary by Elements Army Air Corps Equipment - All personnel is to wear personal IR strobe while operating in low light if available 5. Command and Signal Chain of Command OC - Lt. Col Frost 2IC - Major Smith 3IC - Major Flavell 4IC - Major Hicks - A Coy OC 5IC - Major John - B Coy OC Signals A Coy CSI: ROMEO B Coy CSI: ECHO C Coy CSI: INDIA HQ Coy CSI: JULIETT CEI: As per SOP 6. Map Data ++++++++++++++ENDS+++++++++++++++
  4. TO: MAJ HICKS OC A COY 16AA BDE FROM: LT COL FROST OC 2PARA 16AA BDE SUBJECT: OPERATION FLINTLOCK PRIORITY: FLASH/CRITIC CLASSIFICATION: SECRET UK EYES ONLY ++++++++++++++BEGINS++++++++++++++++ 1. Situation (A) Enemy Forces (1) Disposition, Composition and Strength (a) Disposition There are known Militia forces in the size of platoons. Loyal to their local population, in the following towns: MGANZA NYOGO/KYETE GABU NHALEHENGUE MANSOA Known Militia forces that are larger than Platoon Size in the following towns: GABU MADIMBA NHACA BISSORA QUINHAMEL REGIONS of INTEREST is the following: Town of GABU has close to COMPANY SIZE militia presence with known affiliations to illegal organizations. Their attitude towards British forces is gauged to be suspicious. Beyond that, movement has been seen in the region NORTH of town of GABU by elements of forward recon forces. Known presence of additional Militia forces in vicinity town of NHALEHENGUE. No known affiliations with forces in town of GABU. Attitude it gauged to be neutral with British effort. GRID 129 235, abandoned military complex. SBS forces report no enemy movement in the vicinity over the past few weeks. Possibility of enemy presence therefor gauged unlikely. Town of MANSOA has a Militia presence. Size in the range of Platoon. Affiliated with town of GABU is gauged probable. Attitude towards British Forces therefore gauged to be suspicious. (b) Composition Militia forces are in possession of small arms. Additionally forces are known to possess heavy weapon armed pickups, denoted as Technicals. Additionally the possession of Rocket propelled grenades and light machine guns are considered probable. They operate without an apparent uniform. Forward Reconnaissance units have reported that forces in vicinity of GABU possess heavy weapons in static positions, overlooking their approaches. Known to be well equipped with wheeled transport and capable of mounted warfare. Known enemy forces with greater cohesion is currently operating in area north of GABU. Units operate with uniformed personnel and are gauged to be a greater threat to British Forces. In possession of large quantity of light machine guns and rocket propelled grenades. Also known to be in possession of explosives and varied forms of mines. Possession of AAA weapons are considered confirmed but in low quantities. Possession of MANPADS are confirmed. Have low possibility to operate vehicles beyond wheeled softskins. Gauged to be competent in useage of maneuver warfare and especially capable of jungle warfare in smaller cooperating units.The unit operates in camouflage gear but lack a common uniform over the unit as a whole. © Strength Most forces are geographically isolated and will not be able to recover from decisive actions from British Forces striking at known strongholds. The enemy still do have a strong tie to the local population which will support the enemies effort if British forces strike. It is also gauged improbable that we will be able to win the hearts of the people if we engage the enemy. The enemy has a good supply of arms and ammunition and a healthy import through smuggling organizations working in the region. Therefore it is gauged unlikely that the access to weapons will be a limiting factor to the enemies strength. It is also gauged likely that fierce combat with enemy forces will draw further reinforcements from neighbouring regions affiliated with the mentioned smuggling rings. (2) Capabilities (a) Maneuver The probable scheme of maneuver of the enemy is infantry tactics and employing hit and run tactics supported by the dense foliage. The enemy is also capable of using mines and explosive devices to disrupt British movement. Enemy forces also possess a limited capacity to employ motorized warfare from soft skinned vehicles. (b) Intelligence The main intelligence capability of the enemy forces is gauged to be their strong ties with the local population. The enemy is also gauged likely to employ scare tactics and torture to gather intelligence on British forces. © Fire Support The enemy is gauged to possess limited indirect fire support in the form of small amounts of short range artillery systems. It is also gauged unlikely that the enemy possess competent observers. Enemy forces do possess limited night fighting capabilities in the form of illumination ammunition. (d) Mobility, Countermobility, Survivability The enemy possess a good ability to maneuver in the dense foliage of the region. The enemy also possess a good understanding of the nature and the fauna leading to a good capacity to stay in the terrain for extended time. Coupled to that, the enemy possess the capacity to use the terrain against British forces that is gauged to be less competent in sustained operations inside the jungle. (e) Air Defence The enemy possess limited Air Defence assets. Mostly in the form of shoulder launched AAA missiles. Also in possession of antique AAA gun platforms in the form of old Russian static weapon systems (f) Combat service support The enemy possess a antiquated yet robust logistic chain. Usage of human carriers and animals as transport is gauged the most common. Transport of ammunition, fuel and supplies is mainly done by individual units. Some capacity to transport by terrain vehicles in the form of pick-ups. The enemy is capable of living of nature to further extend their capacity for operations in the terrain. (g) Command and Control The enemy possess limited capacity for command and control. Some formations do not possess the capacity for radio communication. Most forces possess mobile phones for long range communications outside of direct combat situations. Some factions may be in possession of limited Satcom systems. The enemy is also gauged probable to operate in independent smaller units to circumvent these limitations. (3) Most Probable Course of Action (a) Tactical The first one is that the enemy is most probably going to try and pull british forces into the jungle. Small units seeking contact with British forces before breaking contact and retreating. The intent of the enemy action is to draw British forces into the foliage to limit our capacity to bring close air support and indirect fire down on them. Further it limits our capacity to organize our larger numbers. Drawn into the jungle, British forces can expect snap ambushes where the retreating force pulls british forces into the kill zone of secondary enemy positions. Another likely scenario is the enemy forces pulling back through mined terrain. Also likely that they try and employ both tactics at once to lock British forces inside the kill zone. A good thing to note is the enemy will most likely try and avoid operations during the night. The most likely time for major actions would be in the dawn or dusk. Where they can strike with the element of surprise, use the oncoming night to escape or use the very common fog to camouflage their movement. (b) Strategical Also, the enemy is gauged likely to target the local population to turn them against British forces. A few likely method is to torture villagers, destroy property, target their livelihood or the threat of any of the above. (4) Most Dangerous Course of Action The most dangerous course of action of the enemy is twofold. The most dangerous course of action to British forces is if we are unable to win the hearts of the population and the enemy manages to bind the local militias to their cause. With the added support of forces spread through the jungle it allows the enemy to attack our supply convoys and disrupt our movement. Effectively disrupting our capacity to operate and limiting our capacity to safely CASEVAC and resupply ground forces. The second most dangerous course of action is if the enemy targets World Health Organization or World Food Organization (WHO/WFO) formations, effectively disrupting the humanitarian effort and destroying the support for British forces both in the region but also at home. (B) Friendly Forces (1) Higher Unit (a) Missions Statement Taskforce Flintlock?s mission is to establish a secure zone for units WHO and WFO to operate safely to prepare for humanitarian aid destined for the local population. Further the missions is to maintain stability and security as the humanitarian effort progresses. An emphasis on the secure distribution of food, water and the administration of medicine. (b) Intent Statement The OCs intent is to establish a safe zone by drawing the enemy forces out into the jungle and deny them operations within the confines of the towns. The means to establish this is by inviting the enemy to fight on locations outside of the populated regions while striking at vital smuggling routes that sustains enemy operations. © Concept of Operation British forces will establish presence on the ground. Therein they will create the capacity to maintain presence in the populated regions. Additionally friendly forces will start patrols through region to form an intelligence picture to allow further action. Emphasis will be on establishing a picture that takes into account likely enemy courses of action and movement. The main effort for the first days is to give friendly forces the means to deny the enemy resources and support. Establishing a good relation with local population is of utmost importance and all forces shall take extreme care to see to the needs of the population to establish trust and support for both the British forces and the United Nations. Aerial forces shall be ready to provide transport of vital supplies untill WHO/WFO is able to start their work in the region. Doing so as soon as possible will further lay ground for the populations trust of British forces. In addition to this, Army Air will focus most of their strike capacity to the forces deployed within the jungle, to allow movement and operations. The terrain of the jungle judged to be hard to dominate without the added mobility and firepower. As a secondary consideration, medical personnel is allowed to prepare to administer basic medical aid to the local population if operations so permit. (2) Left Unit Operating in the built up region is formations from 1st Battalion Royal Irish Regiment. Deployed alongside them is elements of 23th Royal Engineers. Their main effort is to establish secure locations for the distribution of aid from WHO/WFO stations within the city confines. (3) Right Unit East of the peninsula is 40 Commando Royal Marine. Their main effort is to establish presence along the coastline and maintain control of the waterways into the mainland. (4) Forward Unit None, we are the Brigades most forward unit (5) Reserve Unit In Reserve is 4th Battalion Parachute Regiment, stationed on bases in mainland Uganda, ready to deploy within 12 hours in any part of the AO. (6) Supporting Units We are the main effort of the Air Corps, and will have priority for Close Air Support and Air Mobility. Units of 7th Royal Horse Artillery Regiment is also operating in support of 40 Commando, and will be able to divert to assist if the local area deteriorates. © Enviroment (1) Obstacle The main obstacle of the Battalion will be the jungle itself. With the possibility of dangerous diseases and animals it will be paramount that all units maintains a high medical preparation for these matters. Also the availability of fresh water will be limited, meaning that all operations must take place within a the reach of logistical efforts. We do not believe the enemy will be limited by this to the same extent as they have good knowledge of the ground and have plenty experience in operating in jungle terrain. Their capacity to find their way in the jungle will also be superior as they have access to personnel who grew up in the region. (2) Avenues of Approach At this time the enemy?s likely avenues of approach is unknown. But their capacity to move through the jungle will make it especially important to maintain a high alert while operating within or close to the dense jungle. The dense foliage also limits our capacity to use our helicopters for mobility. Yet, the speed is still an advantage, although the limited amount of landing sites will put even further emphasis on proper tactics when moving into the region. (3) Key Terrain The key terrain in the region will be the peninsula and open ground. The control of the towns will also be of outmost importance to maintain security. We must at all times work to deny the enemy access to the towns and the civilian population. Making sure we retain control of open ground enables us to maintain movement and airlift capabilities. If we let the enemy dominate the open ground they will be able to seriously hamper our capabilities. (4) Cover and concealment The dense tree cover will work in favor of the enemy. Denying us the capacity to deploy UAVs and gunships for both force protection and reconnaissance. Some elements of the enemy forces are gauged to take little heed to the safety of the civilian population and might use them as cover or concealment. As the safety of the civilian population is the main concern great effort must be taken to deny the enemy this chance.
  5. [spoiler][IMG]http://i.imgur.com/vYtieLN.png[/IMG][/spoiler] The refrenced article is here: [URL="https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BwOId3asnPRqY2U1cnlqUEk1TXc/view?usp=sharing"]N'Ziwasogo "The Forgotten War"[/URL]
  6. 7 RHA Attendance Yes (4) RSM Field LBdr Pettersson Gnr Aposky Gnr Balkau Maybe (1) Gnr Beardmore No/LOA (0) Unconfirmed (1) Gnr Hogg
  7. 7 RHA Attendance Yes (6) RSM Field LBdr Pettersson Gnr Aposky Gnr Balkau Gnr Beardmore Gnr Hogg Maybe (0) No/LOA (0)
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